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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMIC COERCION: "FORCE," THE OIL
WEAPON AND EFFECTS UPON PRICES
After numerous writings on the legal permissibility or
impermissibility of the employment of the Arab oil weapon
from October 1973 to March 1974 and the social consequences
of the decision to employ economic coercion against numerous
states, adequate attention has not yet been paid to three im-
portant aspects of law and fact: (1) A policy-oriented in-
terpretation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter,
(2) Production Cuts and Embargoes, and (3) Price Increases
and War Aims. Confusion and even outright inaccuracy has
flowed from the printed scratchings of scholars and advocates
engaged in an incomplete reference to legal policies at
stake and the many relevant features of context. Insuffi-
cient attention has also been paid to past trends in authori-
tative decision, conditioning factors and the effects of par-
ticular strategies of economic coercion upon all values in
various interdetermined social processes.
Effort is now under way to move beyond consideration
of the oil weapon, to analyze economic coercion in general and
to articulate useful criteria for-decision concerning the per-
missibility or impermissibility of any strategy of economic
coercion under international law. However, future effort to
articulate criteria and relate past use of economic coercion,
such as the Arab use of oil as a politic-economic weapon,
will be hampered if there is insufficient awareness of the
three aspects of law and fact that are addressed in this comment.
Of primary concern is the failure of many scholars to
attempt a richer, policy-oriented interpretation of Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which proscribes certain
threats or uses of force in international relations. A second
and third concern are interrelated--the failure of many writ-
ers to adequately perceive the Intertwined impact of war ob-
jectives: economic strategies of coercion and sharp, drastic
increases in the market price of oil. Whether it is de-
terminative of permissibility or not, one should not lose
sight of the fact that the Arab oil embargoes and production
cuts were war related. Furthermore, it is unrealistic and
inhibiting of future scholarly effort to treat the oil price
increases and formal OPEC announcements of price as outcomes
of pure economic decision-making. This comment explores each
of these concerns.
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The Question of Force
Professor Derek Bowett, in his article on "Interna-
tional Law and Economic Coercion," argues that the "rele-
vance" of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter to situ-
ations of intense economic coercion is "doubtful."] He finds;
instead, that such forms of economic coercion as the Arab oil
weapon are regulated under Article 2(7) of the Charter, which
proscribes certain forms of intervention into what are essen-
tially the "domestic" affairs of other states. 2 Professor'
Richard Lillich, confronted with this problem of Charter in-
terpretation, preferred to accept Professor Bowett's approach,
noting all the while that both Professor Bowett and Dr.
Shihata, in a Virginia symposium, recognized that certain
forms of economic coercion are impermissible under interna-
tional law. 3 There are similar attempts to preclude Article
2(4) from a useful role in the management of economic coer-
cion, but it seems that each of these authors were just a bit
unmindful of some of the basic points made about the Interpreta-
tion of Article 2(4) in a pre- and post-Charter formation
context.
Elsewhere it is pointed out that Article 2(4) of the
Charter does not contain any restrictive words such as
"armed" which would limit application of the article merely
to situations of "armed" force. The prohibition applies to
certain forms of threat or use of force.4  No one has ever
proven that the intent of the drafters was that only armed
force was proscribed;5 neither has anyone proven that the
predominant expectation today is that only armed force is
proscribed in Article 2(4). Much of the myth of restriction
is based upon conjecture or resolutions that were not adopted
for various, unarticulated reasons. Needless to say it is
not based upon the semantic definitional exercise by diction-
ary toting textual ists exploring the "meaning" of' the term;6
1. 16 Va.J.Int'l L. 245 (1976).
2. See ibid.
3. See Lillich, "Economic Coercion and the "New In-
ternational Order": A Second Look at Some First Impressions,"
16 Va.J.Int'l L. 233, 236, 238 (1976).
4. See Paust & Blaustein, "The Arab Oil Weapon--A
Threat to International Peace," 68 Am.J.Int'l L. 410, 415-417
(1974). Also see Paust & Blaustein, "The Arab Oil Weapon: A
Reply and Reaffirmation of Illegality," 15 Col.J.Trans.L. 57
(1976).
5. See also M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, Law and Mini-
mum World Public Order 124 n.6 (1961).
6. See, e.g., Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary,
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nor is it based upon the objects and purposes of the United
Nations Charter, which are indeed broad. It seems rather un-
usual for textualist-oriented scholars to ignore even the
textualist commands, e.g., of the 1969 Vienna Convention of
the Law of Treaties. Articles 31 and 32 of that convention
would require some effort to investigate the "ordinary" mean-
ing of a term that may, if necessary, be supplemented and con-
firmed by the preparatory work. Moreover even such an ap-
proach to interpretation requires that the word "force" be in-
terpreted in its textual context and in light of the object
and purpose of the treaty, thus taking into consideration the
phrase "in any manner" and other articles of the Charter such
as Articles 1(2), 1(3), 2(7), 55(c) and 56.
From a contextualist's perspective, however, a more
realistic approach to interpretation would (1) investigate
the whole flow of past and subsequent communication to deter-
mine relevant common expectation, (2) supplement ambiguities
by reference to basic expectation and (3) further integrate,
when necessary, particular expectations with more intensely
demanded and basic community policies at stake.7 In the
present case, however, there is no generally shared pre-
Charter formation expectation that precludes interpretation
of Article 2(4) as proscribing certain forms of economic co-
ercion. As McDougal and Feliciano point out, "[t]he dis-
cussions and preparatory work at San Francisco appear some-
what confused and equivocal" with regard to modalities of co-
ercion sought to be proscribed "and hardly yield conclusive
"force," 449 (1974), stating: "to compel by physical, moral
or intellectual means . . . to press, drive, attain to, or
effect against resistance . . . to produce only with un-
natural or unwilling effort . . . syn FORCE, COMPEL, COERCE
."; and I The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dic-
tionary 419-420 (1971), stating: "5d. In non-material sense:
Constraint or compulsion exerted upon a person . . .; 7. Of
things . . . Power to influence, aect or control
3. To constrain by force . . . to compel . . to compel
one . . . to adopt a policy he dislikes; 4. To compel, con-
strain, or oblige (a person, oneself, etc.) to do a thing
to drive (a person, etc.) to or into (a course of ac-
tion, a condition)." (emphasis originalT.) From these defi-
nitional approaches it is certain that the dictionary ap-
proach to a meaning of "force" is far broader than "armed
force" and that it includes any modality of coercion.
7. See, e.g., M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & J. Miller,
The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order (1967);
and McDougal, "Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles
of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Poli-
cies," 14 Va.J.Int'l L. 387-396, passim (1974).
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indication of the correctness" of an assertion that "force"
meant "armed force. '8 Subsequent practice has not established
any special meaning different from the approach taken and recom-
mended here, that the economic modality is regulated by Arti-
cle 2(4) of the Charter. Indeed, general expectation evident
in subsequent U.N. resolutions supports our approach.
Much of the "myth" about Article 2(4) moreover Ignores the
kinds of prohibition contained in the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, Article 16; the 1954 Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind; the Draft
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, 1949; the Essen-
tials of Peace resolution, 1949; the Peace Through Deeds reso-
lution, 1950; the 1965 Declaration on Inadmissibility of In-
tervention; the Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation, 1970; and
others. 9 These prohibitions, as elucidated by Lillich,
Bowett and others, demonstrate continuing community expecta-
tions that,in appropriate contexts,certain forms of economic
coercion are unlawful under international law, including
Charter law.
As Professor Bowett declared some time ago, the pur-
pose of the phraseology in Article 2(4) of the Charter at
the time-of its adoption was not a "qualifying" purpose;
phrases within the article were not designed to qualify the
general-proscription.10  With this background of
draftsmanship in mind one certainly cannot read into the arti-
8. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 5, at 124 n.8
Also see id. at 125 and 17U-179. See Lillich, "Economic Co-
ercion andthe International Legal Order," 51 Int'l Aff. 358,
360-361 (1975); Boorman, "Economic Coercion in International
Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and the Ensuing Juridical Issues,"
9 J.Int'l L. & Econ. 205, 220-223 (1974); Comment, "The Use
of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under Article
2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations," 122 U.Pa.L.Rev.
983 (1974); Brosche, "The Arab Oil Embargo and United States
Pressure Against Chile: Economic and Political Coercion and
the Charter of the United Nations," 7 Case W.Res.J.Int'l L.
3 (1974); J. Stone, Aggression and World Order 58-59, 66
f8., 85, 111 (1958).
9. See Paust & Blaustein, 68 Am.J.Int'l L., supra
note 4, at 17*-418.
10. D. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law 151
(1958).
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cle other qualifying words, such as "armed," that do not ex-
ist. 1 1 One must read the article with this general prohibi-
tion in mind; and, as McDougal and Feliciano point out, this
prohibition was extensive.12 Moreover, the article contains
an important phrase that seems to have escaped the scholarly
attention of Professors Lillich and Bowett in their dis-
cussions. Article 2(4), in addition to territorial integrity
and political independence, addresses threats or uses of force
which are "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations." This is a significant phrase for at
least two reasons: (1) it further reinforces the general
prohibition in terms of forms of force prohibited ("in any
other manner"), and (2) if, arguendo, economic coercion is
Included within modalities of "force" proscribed by Article
2(4), the use of economic coercion that violates Article 2(7),
or any other article of the Charter, would also be violative
of Article 2(4) since a violation of Article 2(7) would in-
volve actions that were inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations; thus also, Article 2(4).13
Debate about permissible and impermissible forms of
economic coercion will enhance a more comprehensive awareness
of all of the legal policies at stake and the social consequences
that flow from these decisions. In this regard, I am pleased
to find recognition of several prohibitions of certain forms
II. See II 0ppenheim's International Law 154 (H.
Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed., 1952).
12. McDougal & Feliciano, supra note 5, at 179. On
economic coercion, also see id. at 177-179, 190-196, 200,
pass im.
13. The fact of interrelated prohibition (with 2(4)
and 2(7)) compels a contextual and policy-serving interpreta-
tion of the word "force" In Article 2(4) that is consistent
with, and serving of, an Integrated prohibition. Thus, an
interrelated prohibition compels a contextual interpretation
of "force" which includes economic coercion that is violative
of Article 2(7). Since the Arab oil weapon clashed with norms
and expectations intertwined with a policy-serving interpreta-
tion of Article 2(7) and constituted an unlawful form of in-
tervention into what were essentially domestic affairs of
other states (i.e., their determination of their foreign pol-
icy, and so forth), such a use of economic coercion neces-
sarily was employed "in any manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations" and was, therefore, also pro-
hibited under Article 2(4).
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of economic coercion by nearly all of the contributors to a
recent symposium in the Virginia Journal.1 4 From here we can
map out the types of consensus, common interest and other
criteria that are useful for more detailed inquiry and norma-
tive guidance for future choice.
Production Cuts and Embargoes
The 1973 oil production cuts and embargoes were direct-
ly related to an Arab effort to compel Israel to withdraw 'from
occupied territory. Furthermore,the 1973 Arab efforts to cut
production, as a strategy to coerce other states, and to em-
ploy an oil embargo as a second, interrelated form of eco-
nomic coercion directly resulted from the 1973 war. As the
October 17, 1973 communique issued by the Conference of Arab
Oil Ministers in Kuwait states:
Before and during the present war, the
United States has been active in supplying
Israel . . . The Arabs have therefore been
induced [to cut oil production], unless the
international community hastens to rectify
matters by compelling Israel to withdraw
from our occupied territory, as well as letting
the U.S. know the heavy price which the big in-
dustrial countries are having to pay as a re-
sult. .. 15
The communique also announced a five percent production cut,
'With a similar reduction to be applied in each surcessive
month," until the Arab war efforts were achieved.] More-
over, the communique emphasized a direct nexus between war
aims, the embargo and production cuts. The communique spe-
cifically declared that no production cuts or interruptions
in oil would occur for "any friendly state." 17 It further
added that the Arab states were ready "to supply the world
with its oil needs as soon as the world shows it's sympathy
with [them] and denounces the aggression against [them].'1 8
In an attempt to justify this use of economic coercion
and subsequent communiques and actions in the face of Inter-
national legal norms to the contrary, Dr. Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, then a Legal Advisor for the Kuwait Fund for Arab
14. 16 Va.J.int'l L. 233 (1976).
15. Official text reprinted in I. Shihata, The Case
for the Arab Oil Embargo, appendix I, at 75 (1975).
16. See id.
17. Id. See also infra note 19.
18. I . --
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Economic Development and the present Director-General of the
OPEC Special Fund alleged, incorrectly, that the relevant
norms assume "normal peacetime conditions" and "cannot apply
in an actual war situation where belligerent states are ordi-
narily entitled, in accordance with the rules of the law of
war, to use their economic power to coerce their adversaries
and even to inflict damage on third parties."1 9 That, of
course, is one of the justifications offered for the embargoes
of several states. 2 0 What is significant about the Director-
General's statement concerning this inquiry is the admission
that both forms of economic coercion (the production cuts and
the more directly coercive embargoes) were tied to the war ef-
fort.
There can be no doubt that these high level Arab ad-
missions, printed as the only type of justification offered
under international law, are factually correct and that these
two forms of economic coercion were tied to the war effort.
While hostilities were still in progress, although certain
military operations had terminated,2 1 a second meeting of the
Arab Oil Ministers was held on November 4-5 in Kuwait to fur-
ther a shift from a military effort to an intensified use of
economic force as, the Director-General wrote, "an attempt to
enhance the use of oil for accelerating the process of reach-
ing a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict."22
At the second meeting, it was decided that a production cut
amounting to twenty-five percent of the September, 1973 pro-
duction levels was to be implemented.2 3 Another five percent
reduction was threatened for December. "As a result, a total
reduction of about 2,826,000 b/d or some 28.5 percent below
the September average became effective," among four states,
19. See Shihata, "Destination Embargo of Arab Oil:
Its Legality Under International Law," 68 Am.J.Int'l L. 591,
618 (1974).
20. See id. at 596. Also see 17 Middle East Economic
Survey, No. C,at2 and 7-8 (Nov. 30, 1973).
21. On "war" and "hostilities," see also U.S. Dep't.
of Army Pam No. 27-161-2, II InternationaT-La-w-T-33, 207-212
(1962); Pan American Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty, 505 F.2d
989 (1974); Shihata supra note 19, at 592-595; 17 Middle East
Economic Survey, no. I, at 3 and 9-11 (Oct. 26, 1973) (Saudi
Arabian armed forces remain under Syrian command); and 17
Middle East Economic Survey no. 6, at 4-6 (Nov. 30, 1973)
(Communique, Sixth Arab Summit Meeting, recognizing a con-
tinuation of war).
22. Shihata, supra note 19, at 595.
23. See Shihata, supra note 15, appendix III, at 83.
The dramatic level of production cutback, by 25 percent, in-
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with a total cut of approximately 4.875 million b/d.
24
Each of these coercive measures was designed to fur-
ther war efforts as outlined in a formal Resolution issued
by the first Kuwait Conference on October 17, 1973. Pertinent
parts of the resolution supplement the demonstrated nexus be-
tween war aims and the economic coercive measures taken. As
the resolution states:
Cons'derin that the direct goal of the current
battle is the liberation of the Arab territories oc-
cupied in the June 1967 war and the recovery of thd
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in ac-
cordance with the United Nations resolutions; . . .
Considering that the economic situation of many
Arab oil producing countries does not justify rais-
ing oil production, though they are ready to make
such an increase in production to meet the require-
ments of major consumer industrial nations that tom-
mit themselves to cooperation with us for the purpose
of liberating our territories;
Decided that each Arab oil exporting country
immediately cuts its oil production by a recurrent
monthly rate of no less than 5% to be initially
counted on the virtual production of September, and
thenceforth on the last production figure until such
a time as the international community compels Israel
to relinquish our occupied territories or until the
production of every individual country reaches the
point where its economy does not permit of any fur-
ther reduction without detriment to its national and
Arab obligations.
cluded volumes deducted as a result of embargoes against the
U.S. and Holland. See 17 Middle East Economic Survey, no. 2,
at 2 (Nov. 2, 1973)-
24. Shihata, supra note 19, at 595, citin 17 Middle
East Economic Survey, Supp., at 2, 5 (Nov. 6, 173) (for
Libya, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Qatar); c.f. 16 Middle East Eco-
nomic Survey, no. 52, at 3-4 (Oct. T, 1973), estimating a
total OAPEC production in September of around 19.5 million
b/d, 'which means that a 5-10 percent cut would take between
I and 2 million b/d" out of circulation, quoted with approval
in Shihata, supra note 19, at 594; and 17 Middle East Eco-
nomic Survey, no. 1, at 3 (Oct. 26, 1973), disclosing the
fact that a 10 percent cut in Saudi Arabian oil alone, when
tied to the impact of the embargo against the U.S., resulted
in "a reduction of approximately 2.3 million b/d." The "b/d"
symbol is used as a shorthand expression of barrels daily.
Twenty five percent of 19.5 b/d (the total Sept. production)
is equal to a total cut of some 4.875 million b/d.
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Nevertheless, the countries that support the
Arabs actively and effectively or that take important
measures against Israel to compel its withdrawal shall
not be prejudiced by this production cut and shall
continue to receive the same oil supplies that they
used to receive prior to the reduction. Though the
cut rate will be uniform in respect of every individ-
ual oil exporting country, the decrease in the sup-
plies provided to the various consuming countries may
well be aggravated proportionately with their support
to and cooperation with the Israeli enemy.
If any doubt remains, it is clearly stated in subsequent pub-
lications by Director-General Shihata that this nexus existed.
He wrote:
In October 1973, Arab oil-exporting States im-
posed an outright embargo on oil shipments to cer-
tain destinations and coupled it with across-the-board
production cutbacks. Such exceptional measures were
implemented during a war situation in which military
personnel from Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Al-
geria joined the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces in
an attempt to put an end to the forcible Israeli oc-
cupation of Egyptian and Syrian territories. The ob-
jective of these measures was to discourage certain
countries from violating their obligations of neu-
trality toward Arab belligerents and from continuing
their encouragement of, or their acquiescence in, the
illegal occupation and annexation of Arab territor-
ies. .5
The Sixth Arab Summit Conference held in Algiers from
November 26 to 28, 1973, issued another oil resolution that
further evidences the direct nexus between Mid East hos-
tilities and the oil embargoes and production cuts imposed.
The resolution declared in clear and trenchant language:
The Conference resolves to continue using oil as
an economic weapon In the battle until such time as
the withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories is
completed and the national rights of the Palestinian
25. Shihata, "Arab Oil Policies and the New Interna-
tional Economic Order," 16 Va.J.Int'l L. 261, 267 (1976).
Also see A. Attiga, Secretary General of OAPEC, letter to
Petroleum Press Service, reprinted at 17 Middle East Economic
Survey, no. 10, it IV (Dec. 28, 1973) stating: 'The Arab
governments began their policy of reducing oil production in
self-defense and as a direct result of the October war "
and Shihata, supra note 19, at 592-594 .and 608, passim.
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people are restored, in accordance with the follow-
ing bases:
-- Maintenance of the embargo on countries sup-
porting Israel.'
-- Maintenance of the progressive cuts in oil pro-
duction to the extent that the reduction in in-
come accruing to any of the producing countries
should not exceed one-quarter on the basis of
the 1972 income level.
-- Formation of a committee composed of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs and Oil of the Arab oil pro-
ducing states with the following functions:
1) To draw up a list classifying states in ac-
cordance with the following categories:
friendly countries; neutral countries; and
countries supporting the enemy.
2) To follow up the implementation of the de-
cision of the use of oil . . 26
As if to stress the fact that the production cuts and embar-
goes were only related to the war effort, Director-General
Shihata declared that these measures were not initiated as
"price" or economic measures.2 7 They certainly affected
world oil prices,2 8 but price increases were "the consequence
of the cutbacks rather than their objective."29 As the
Director-General stated:
OPEC policy instruments have consistently been
confined to fiscal and pricing measures. The only
instance of coordinated output restrictions by the
Arab oil exporters occurred during the period of
October 1973 - March 1974. And these restrictive
measures were implemented outside the scope of
OPEC and were meant to serve a specific political
purpose completely unrelated to the price issue. 30
26. See Shihata, supra note 15, appendix V, at 87.
Also see 17 Middle East Economic Survey, no. 6, at 1-9
(Nov. 30, 1973).
27. Shihata, supra note 25, at 263.
28. See supra notes 19 and 25; Paust & Blaustein,
"The Arab Oil Weapon - A Threat to International Peace," supra
note 4,at 410; Paust & Blaustein, "The Arab Oil Weapon: A Re-
ply and Reaffirmation of Illegality," supra note 4, at 57
(1976); and infra note 33; Akbar, "The Iranian Reaction to
Increased Oil Revenues," 24 Am.U.L.Rev. 1175 n.] (1975).
29. Shihata, supra note 25, at 263.
30. Id.
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Even with this admission, however, an official denial that oil
price increases as such were war related persists; 3 1 but the
facts and admissions prove otherwise.
Price Increases and War Aims
As demonstrated above, certain price increases were a
direct consequence of the production cuts. It is a basic eco-
nomic reality that production cuts will have a direct effect
upon the amount of oil available in the international market;
thus, a direct effect upon the price of oil--an increase in
price will normally follow a decrease in available amounts of
oil. Furthermore, the embargoes dried up the normal access
of consumers to the international market. That market of
available oil was not only diminished greatly by eventual pro-
duction cuts of around twenty-five percent but, for embargoed
states, were cut off severely. An increase in price, as a
direct consequence of the wartime production cuts and com-
plete embargoes, was an economic certainty. The consequential
impact on prices, a United States Senate Subcommittee Report
adds, "was immediate and dramatic."32
It is also important to note that Arab and Israeli com-
bat operations resulted in the damage or destruction of oil
facilities, pipelines and oil stored in or near such facili-
ties. A United States Subcommittee Report provided precise
details: "Military action curtailed up to two-thirds of the
2 million'barrels per day exports from major Eastern Mediter-
ranean pipeline terminals." 3 3 An OAPEC advertisement in The
Guardian on November 15, 1973 added that Israeli raids on-oil
export terminals aggravated the shortage of oi13 4 and, neces-
31. See id., at 262-263, passim.
32. Report, U.S. Oil Companies and the Arab Oil Em-
bargo; Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Committee
on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, at 13 (Jan. 27, 1975).
Also see Penrose, "The Development of Crisis," 104 Daedalus -
Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 39, 50-
51 and 54 (1975); Mikdashi, "The OPEC Process," id. at 203,
205; and Jensen, "International Oil - Shortage, Cartel or
Emerging Resource Monopoly?," 7 Vand.J.Transnat'l L. 335, 336-
337 and 381 (1974).
33. Id. at 14. Two thirds of 2 million b/d would be
some 1,320,000 b/d.
34. The Guardian, Nov. 15, 1973, reprinted at 17 Mid-
dle East Economic Survey, no. 4, at i-ii (Nov. 16, 1973).-
Also see A. Attiga, Secretary General of OAPEC, letter, supa
note 25, at v; October 17, 1973 Communique, Conference OT
Arab Oil Ministers, supra note 15; and supra note 32.
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sarily, aggravated the spiraling price increases.
The recognition of war related impacts of production
cuts and militarily damaged or destroyed oil and oil facili-
ties on oil prices is important for an understanding of actual
effects in the market-price process. With this recognition,
for example, it is evident that formal announcements of
price increases by the Ministers of six Gulf members of OPEC
on October 16, 1973 and November 1, 1973 were not in fact the
only stimulants of price increases. It is significant to
note also that the new formula announced unilaterally by the
six Gulf members of OPEC on October 16th, and used subse-
quently, linked posted prices and future adjustments in price
to market prices,3 5 which were already conditioned by sharp
production cuts and combat damage or destruction.3
6 It was
already a seller's market, an artificial market manipulated
by intentional, war related cuts in production and exacerbated
by combat damage and destruction. To a certain extent,'the
announcement of price increases was merely a formal recogni-
tion of spiraling increases that had already occurred in a
manipulated market where buyers scrambled for what oil was
available and thus drove prices even higher. As the Gulf members'
October communique announced,the posted price increase of
some 70% from $3.Oll/barrel to $5.119/barrel represented "only
a 17% increase over the actual sale of the same crude re-
cently."3 7 Using the same market based formula, an announce-
ment of the Arab decision to adopt an additional 130% increase
in the posted price of oil was made in December.38 Between
35. See, . 17 Middle East Economic Survey, no. 5,
at 4, 6 (Nov. 23, 1973); 16 Middle East Economic Survey_, no.
52, at 4-6 (Oct. 19, 1973); 12 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly,
no. 42, at 9ff. (Oct. 16, 1973).
36. The announcement of a 25 percent production cut
in November in many cases only mirrored an actuality--war re-
lated production cuts had already occurred in many states be-
yond the 5 percent announcement of October. See Shihata,
supra note 19, at 595 (e.g., 10 percent in Saudi Arabia, 25
percent in Kuwait); and Shihata, supra note 25, at 263 (price
rises and cutbacks). Also see supra note 32.
37. See Gulf state communique of October 16, 1973,
reproduced at l2 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, no. 43, at 9
(Oct. 22, 1973); 16 Middle East Economic Survey, no. 52, at
4-6 (Oct. 19, 1973).
38. See Joelson & Griffin, "The Legal Status of Na-
tion-State Cartels Under United States Antitrust and Public
International Law," 9 Int'l Lawyer 617, 621 (1975), citing
Communique of Dec. 23, 1973, reprinted at 12 Petroleum In-
telligence Weekly, no. 53, at 10 (Dec. 31, 1973).
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October 1 and December 31, 1973 "the posted price of oil rose
from $3.01 per barrel to $11.65 per barrel and the market
price of oil (actually reached a high of)$22 per barrel." 39
Apparently the war related production cuts, which increased
substantially during this period, were significant condition-
ing factors of the actual price of oil when a manipulated
"market price plus" formula was utilized, although the exacti-
tudes (other than the 17 percent increase over market price
noted on October 16th) are not known at this time. What is
known is that the effects of production cuts and combat de-
struction or damage were necessarily built into the market
price formula that was used as a base for subsequent posted
price increase announcements. It is not correct to state,
therefore, that announced price increases arose merely from
economic decision-making in the abstract. The war context
and the war objectives directly shaped market realities,
even assuming an effort by Arab decision-makers to relate
price Increases only to presumed economic goals.
It should be noted, however, that meetings of the six
Gulf members of OPEC (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Abu Dhabi,
Qatar and Iran--with Algeria and Libya as observers)40 to
consider posted price increases were curiously similar to
meetings of OAPEC (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, United Arab
Emirates Qatar, Alberia, Libya, Oman, Egypt, Syria and
Bahrain)41 which considered embargoes and production cuts.
Although it may be conceivable that war objectives were not
considered in oil price increase decision-making, oil price
increases were decided in close parallel to production cut
decisions both in time terms of timing and the parties to these
decisions. They were, in general, concomitant efforts with
intertwined effects. 42Z It is unrealistic to ignore these
actual features of decision in contextandit is doubtful that
the Arab ministers and their advisers would have completely
ignored war objectives and the potential short and long term
39. Id. Also see Amuzegar, "OPEC in the Context of
the Global Power Equation," 4 Denver J.Int'l L.&Pol. 221, 223
(1974); and supra note 32.
40. See, e.g., 12 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, no.
53, at 10 (Dec. 31, 1973).
41. See, e.g., Boorman, "Economic Coercion in Inter-
national Law: the Arab Oil Weapon and the Ensuing Juridical
Issues," 9 J.Int'l L.&Econ. 205 (1974).
42. See Paust & Blaustein, Am.J.Int'l L., supra note
28, at 428 anT434 ; Paust & BlausteIn, Colum.J., supra note
28, at 66 and 69-71. Also see supra note 32.
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war usage of foreseeable oil profits. As the Iraq repre-
sentatives had recognized, the effective use of oil as a
political weapon would require recognition that "economics
and politics go hand in hand. The two are inextricably inter-
related and no country on earth can keep them separate."43
Nevertheless, it would appear that while some portions
of price increases were probably motivated primarily by eco-
nomic considerations, 44 not only did some portions of the
price increases mirror the market effect of production cutp and
combat operations but also other portions of the drastic pricl_
increases must have been motivated by overall war objectives.'15
Again, the exactitudes are unknown at present. What is known
was expressed adequately during the period in question by
Secretary of State Kissinger. He noted that:
without warning, we were faced first with a
political embargo, followed quickly by massive
increases in the price of oil. In the course
of a single year the price of the world's
most strategic commodity was raised 400 per-
cent. The impact has been drastic and global. 46
In conclusion, it is beyond doubt that OAPEC embargoes
and production cuts were war related, that the embargoes and
production cuts directly contributed to price increases and
that certain price increases were, thus, war related. It is
also beyond doubt that some announcement of production cuts
and price increases were partly reflective of actual produc-
tion and market conditions at the time of the announcements;
conditions that were directly intermeshed with war objectives
43. 16 Middle East Economic Survey, supp., no. 52, at
3 (October 19, 1973). Also see Boorman, supra note 28, at
205-206 (Saudi Arabian recognition of the politico-economic
nature of OAPEC in 1968, and agreement by Saudi Arabia and
Egypt on the use of oil profits in the battle against Israel).
See also Bowett, "International Law and Economic Coercion,"
16 Va.J.Int'l L. 245, 249 and 251 n.21 (economic and politi-
cal motives); Stanley, "Some Politico-Legal Aspects of Re-
source Scarcity," 24 Am.U.L.Rev. 1106 (1975).
44. C.f. Shihata, supra note 25, at 270-271.
45. Se-also Paust7 & Taustein, Colum.J., supra note
28, at 57 & 71 (use of oil profits as a weapon) Boorman,
supra note 41, at 205-206; and supra note 43.
46. Address in Chicago, Nov. 14, 1974, reprinted as
U.S. Dep't of State PR 500, at 1 (Nov. 1974).
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and the war context. It is also beyond doubt that the formula
used for announced price increases included a market base, and
that a manipulated market price was built into the formula.
Since war related production cuts and combat produced short-
ages were intertwined with market pricing and since the pro-
duction cuts were intentional, substantial, and rapidly succes-
sive, there can be no doubt that a partially artificial and
manipulated market pricing was a consequence of intentional
production cuts under the circumstances. An imposed scarcity
and a skyrocketing price base seemed to feed each other
through a succession of unilateral manipulations.
Nevertheless, the exactitudes of price increase per-
centages due solely to economic motivation are unknown. It
is suspected that production cuts and combat produced short-
ages, however, were prime contributors to the rapid price in-
creases at the end of 1973, especially given the manipulated
market price impact through the price formula. It should
also be noted that, In one sense, the entire price Increase
(nearly 400 percent) was indirectly war related. If the war
had not occurred, such sharp and rapid increases would not
have been possible. A presently felt "fairness" of present
oil prices (which are less than the wartime market highs) 47
is not a proper focus concerning the question whether the 400
percent increase in oil prices was related, directly or in-
directly, to the war in the Middle East. As an historic fact,
the 400 percent increase in the price of oil was intermeshed
with the war and the overall objectives and strategies of war
partI ci pants.
Jordan J. Paust*
47. See Shihata, supra note 25, at 268 ff.
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